Wills -- Bequest to Wife and Children -- De Facto Wife and Illegitimate Children by Hogg, P. W.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
1972
Wills -- Bequest to Wife and Children -- De Facto
Wife and Illegitimate Children
P. W. Hogg
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation





the clumsy engine of the law, or be mangled by it ." It is submitted
that "morality", in the sense discussed above in relation to
conspiracy to corrupt public morals, should not be subjected to
a direct translation into a criminal offence without much more
consideration of the end to be attained, measured against the appro-
priateness of the means used to attain it . The justification of these
ends can all too easily find itself reduced to the argument : Such and
such conduct is bad because it corrupts public morals (or outrages
public decency), and it corrupts public morals (or outrages public
decency) because it is bad.
The common law has produced some strange beasts, some of
them salutary inventions, some not. It may be that "conspiracy to
corrupt public morals" and "conspiracy to outrage public decency"
are the strangest which will ever be seen . In 1961 a dinosaur rose
from the primaeval swamp; let it not be without the fullest consider-
ation that the tenth anniversary of its rising be celebrated by allow-
ing it to breed.
WILLS-BEQUEST To WIFE AND CHILDREN-DE FACTO WIFE
AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.-The question to be decided in
Re Herlichka' was whether a will which gave property to the testa-
tor's "wife" and "children" should be interpreted as benefiting
the testator's lawful wife and legitimate children or his de facto
wife and illegitimate children .
Stznley Herlichka died in 1967 . At the time of his death he
was married to Audrey Herlichka, and he had two, legitimate
children of that marriage . He had been separated from Audrey
and the children for eleven years before his death. During that
period he had been living as husband and wife with Phyllis Mc-
Kenna, and he had three illegitimate children of that union.
Stanley Herlichka left a will in which his estate was given to
trustees to hold upon the following trusts :
1 . "To deliver to my wife, Phyllis Herlichka, all articles of personal,
domestic and household use or ornament . . ." ;
2. "To hold whatever house and property 1 may own and be using as a
a home at the time of my death as a home for my wife during her
lifetime . . . "
3 . "Upon the death of my wife", to add the house or its proceeds to the
residue of the estate ;
* J . D . Finch, of the Faculty of Law, University of Liverpool.
1 [19691 1 O.R. 724, (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 700.
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4. To invest the residue of the estate "and pay the net income derived
therefrom to or for my wife during her lifetime, provided that during
such time my said Trustees shall pay to or use for the benefit of
each child of mine who is wholly dependent upon my said wife for
support . . . such amount of the said income as my said Trustees
may in their uncontrolled discretion deem advisable" ;
5. "Upon the death of . . . my said wife. . . . to hold whatever house
and property I may own and be using as a home at the time of
my death as a home for my children until there is no longer a
child of mine living and under the age of twenty-one . . ." ;
6. Upon the death of my wife, to divide the residue in equal shares
per stirpes among those of my children then living, or "the issue
of each child of mine who shall predecease the survivor of me
and my wife ."?,
The trustees applied to the Ontario High Court for directions
as to the meaning of these provisions . Osler J. decided that the
reference to "wife", "child" and "children", wherever they oc
curred in the will, referred exclusively to the lawful wife Audrey
and the legitimate children . The de facto wife Phyllis and the
illegitimate children were excluded from any benefit under the
will . Even the bequest of articles of personal, domestic and house-
hold use or ornament, which was expressly "to my wife, Phyllis
Herlichka", was interpreted as a bequest to Audrey.
Osler J. was able to reach this result by the application of
two rules of construction : (1) that the prima facie meaning of
"wife" is lawful wife, and (2) that the prima facie meaning of
"child" is legitimate child. He first considered the gifts to the
children in the last clauses of the will, and he pointed out that the
terms "child" and "children" indicated, prima facie, legitimate
children . He then considered the gifts to the wife in the ear-
lier clauses, and he pointed out that the term "wife" indicated,
prima facie, the lawful wife . These prima facie meanings all fa-
voured Audrey and the legitimate children . But what of the explicit
naming of Phyllis in the first clause? This "single phrase", he
held, did not carry "sufficient weight to persuade me that the
testator's intention when drawing his will was to benefit Phyllis
McKenna or her children at all, let alone to benefit them to the
exclusion of his legitimate children".'
This reasoning involves reading the testator's language back-
wards. If the clauses of the will are read in the order in which
they were written a different conclusion seems inevitable. The
bequest "to my wife Phyllis Herlichka" occurs in the first disposi-
2 The description of the last clause in the judge's opinion (ibid., at p.
727 (O.R .), 703 (D.L.R .)) is incomplete. I have supplied the omission by
conjecture from the tenor of the rest of the opinion. The clauses are set
out in the order in which they appear in the will, but the numbering of
the clauses has been supplied by me.




tive clause. It plainly indicates Phyllis, the de facto wife . 'Refer-
ences to "my wife" or "my said wife" in the immediately succeed-
ing provisions surely refer to the same person . The first reference
to a "child" or "children" is in the clause providing power to main-
tain "each child of mine who is wholly dependent upon my said
wife for support" . Only Phyllis' children could possibly be indi-
cated here, and the references to a child or children in the immedi-
ately succeeding clauses surely mean the same children . .
So much is clear-to me at least-from the face of the will .
The court of construction is of course also permitted to "sit in the
testator's armchair", and to examine the circumstances in which
the testator was situated at the time when he made the will . These
circumstances were recited by Osler J. in his judgment, but he
did not seem to find them helpful. In fact the "armchair evidence"
strongly reinforced the view that the testator's references to his
wife and children were references to Phyllis and Phyllis' children.
The will was made in May 1965. At that time nine years had
elapsed since the testator had deserted Audrey . During that period
he had never seen Audrey or her children .' He had been living as
husband and wife with Phyllis, and he had had three children
of that union. Even if he had not referred to "my wife, Phyllis
Herlichka" in the first dispositive cl-.use, these facts would suggest
that references to his wife in 1965 are more likely to refer to
Phyllis, his current de facto wife, than to Audrey whom he had
abandoned nine years earlier. )Furthermore, the bequest of the. :
contents of the testator's house to his wife, and the direction to
hold the house as a home for his wife, and after her death .for his
children, is a reference to the house in which Phyllis and her
children will actually be living at the time of his death. It would be
very strange if he intended them to vacate their home at the time
of his death and make way for Audrey and her children to move in .
For these reasons it is submitted that Re Herlichka was
wrongly decided.' With respect to the dispositions in favour of the
4 He visited Audrey and her, children several times before he died, but
these visits commenced in May 1966, a year after the will was made, and
therefore shed no light on the interpretation of the will : see supra, foot-
note 1, at pp. 725 (O.R.), 701 (D.L.R.) ; compare pp . 730 (O.R.), 706
(D.L.R .) where Osler J . says that "several visits had been paid", implying
that the visits had been paid before the date of the will - which is in-
correct. Apparently the only connection between the testator and Audrey
in the nine years prior to the will was a court order obtained in 1959 by
Audrey against him for the support of her children .
s Osler J. may have been moved partly by sympathy for the lawful
wife and legitimate children, who had been abandoned by the testator.
But they would be entitled to apply under the Dependants' Relief Act,
R.S.O., 1960, c . 104, now R.S.O., 1970, c. 126, assuming s.'9 does not -
apply, for provision out of the estate. The de facto wife and illegitimate
children have no such right : see s . 1(b) of the Act and Macdonnell and
Sheard, Probate Practice (1953), p . 95 .
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wife, the intention to benefit Phyllis seems to me to be so clear
that the case can be dismissed as one in which a single judge mis-
read a particular will .' With respect to the dispositions in favour
of the children, however, more needs to be said to justify criticism
of the decision .
The authority upon which Osler J . principally relied was a
dictum of Lord Cairns in Hill v . Crook' :
And what appears to me to be the principle which may fairly be
extracted from the cases upon the subject is this-the term "children"
in a will prima facie means legitimate children, and if there is nothing
more in the will, the circumstance that the person whose children
are referred to has illegitimate children will not entitle those illegitimate
children to take .
But there are two classes of cases in which that prima facie inter-
pretation is departed from . One class of cases is where it is impossible
from the circumstances of the parties that any legitimate children
could take the bequest . . . .
The other class of cases is of this kind. Where there is upon the
face of the will itself, and upon a just and proper construction and
interpretation of the words used in it, an expression of the intention of
the testator to use the term "children" not merely according to its
prima facie meaning of legitimate children, but according to a mean-
ing which will apply to, and which will include, illegitimate chil-
dren . . . .
In a recent article in the Law Quarterly Review Dr. J . H . C .
Morris asserted that "Lord Cairns' two exceptions to the rule
are the only exceptions to the rule, and that, however probable
it may be that the testator intended illegitimate children to take,
they will not do so unless they c :.n bring their case within one or
other of the exceptions" .' According to this point of view, the
meaning of the term "children" is not to be ascertained in accord-
ance with the ordinary rules of construction . The armchair evi-
dence which would normally be available to shed light on the
meaning of testamentary language is available only to show that it
was impossible from the circumstances of the parties that any
legitimate children could take . Apart from this special case, the
claim of illegitimate children must be est, blished from the face
of the will itself, no matter how probable it is from the surround-
6 Later on I criticize the rule of construction that "children" means
legitimate children . I do not here criticize the rule that "wife" means law-
ful wife . This latter rule, bearing in mind that it should give way to indi-
cations of a contrary intent (see, e .g., Marks v . Marks (1908), 40 S.C.R .
210), seems to me to be more defensible than the rule concerning children .
It is of course arguable that the courts should not start with any prima
facie meaning in the case of everyday words (see the differing views on
this question in Perrin v. Morgan, [19431 A.C. 399), but it is not my
purpose in this note to enter that debate .
'(1873), L.R. 6 H.L . 265, at pp. 282-283 .





ing circumstances that the testator intended to benefit illegitimate
children .
Does Hill v. Crook bear out this harsh and inflexible doctrine?
In Hill v. Crook the testator bequeathed property to "the chil-
dren or child of my said daughter Mary Crook" . Another clause
referred to "my son-in-law, John Crook" . Another cltiuse re-
ferred to Mary Crook as "the wife of the said John Crook" . At
the time when the will was made Mary Crook was invalidly mar-
ried to John Crook, who was her deceased sister's husband. She
had had two children of that union, who by the law of that time
were illegitim-te, and she was pregnant with a third child, which
was born after the date of the will and was also illegitimate! The
testator knew all these facts.
The strict reading of Lord Cairns' dictum would exclude the
evidence of the testator's knowledge of the state of the family at
the time of the will, for it did not establish the "impossibility" of
Mary having legitimate children ." And yet Lord Cairns himself
regarded the armchair evidence as admissible and relevant. He
said : "In order to interpret the wards of the will, it is always not
only allowable, but it is the duty of the Court to obtain, the
knowledge which the testator had of the state of his family."" A
reading of the whole of Lord Cairns' speech makes clear that
he did not intend his earlier dictum to be read as an exhaus-
tive definition of the only two occasions when illegitimate children
could take under a bequest to children." The other members of
the House, Lords Chelmsford and Colonsay, also relied on the
armchair evidence." They did not approve or repeat the theory
that there were only two exceptions to the rule that "children ° '
means legitimate children. The actual decision in the case was
unanimous in favour of the illegitimate children .
The fact is that the decision in Hill v. Crook was a benevolent
one. Far from laying down strict rules designed to exclude illegiti-
mate children, the House of Lords refused to follow earlier cases
in which such rules had been laid down.' Instead, their Lordships
9 it seems that this child did not join in the proceedings, so that
the blouse of Lords did not have to decide whether an illegitimate
child born after the date of the will could take : infra, footnote 20 . Contra,
3 Jarman on Wills (8th ed., 1951), p. 1771, but see Hill v . Crook, supra,
footnote 7, at pp. 285-286, per Lord Cairns .
10 Mary was obviously still capable of child-bearing because she was
pregnant at the time of the will . Lord Cairns in Hill v . Crook conceded
that "there was no reason why legitimate children might not take under
the bequest of this will" : supra, footnote 7, at p. 283 .
11 Supra, footnote 7, at p . 283 .
12 His reasoning appears more clearly from the penultimate paragraph
of hip opinion : ibid., at v. 285.1%N,
at pp. 277 (Lord Chelmsford), 281 (Lord Colonsay) .
"See the account of the history of the law in Jarman, op. cit., foot-
note 9, p. 1761 .
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decided that the ordinary "dictionary" principle was applicable
to the term "children" . Its prima facie meaning was confined to
legitimate children, but if the testator's intention to include ille-
gitimate children was clear from his language read in the light of
the surrounding circumstances, then the court's duty was to accept
his dictionary and to interpret his language as he intended it.
After Hill v. Crook the strict approach to "children" lingered
on in that the courts occasionally insisted upon very clear indica-
tions of an intention to benefit illegitimate children." Some courts
required that the inclusion of illegitimate children appear by
"necessary implication", which had been defined by Lord Eldon
as "so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary
to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed"."
This test sounds more severe than it is in actual application to
the general run of cases. Jarman's conclusion is that "`necessary
implication' at the present day, would appear to mean little more
than construction (with the aid, if necessary, of extrinsic evi-
dence), as opposed to conjecture"." This certainly seems to me
to be an accurate statement of the Canadian caselaw outside
British Columbia."
In British Columbia a new development occurred in 1950
when Re Hogbin" was decided. In that case a testatrix had be-
queathed the income of her residuary estate to her daughter
Barbara, with remainder to Barbara's "children" or "child".
Barbara died two years after the testatrix, having had one illegiti-
mate child. Was the illegitimate child entitled to the residuary
estate? There was nothing in the will to throw light on the meaning
of the terms "children" or "child" . Nor did the armchair evidence
offer any guidance . The illegitimate child had in fact been born
after the date of the will . In these circumstances the orthodox
answer was clear. There was nothing to rebut the prima facie
meaning of the term "child", which therefore excluded the illegit-
imate child?° Nevertheless, Manson J. in the Supreme Court of
zs In re Dicker, (194711 Ch . 248, critized in a note (1947), 63 L.Q. Rev.
149, is an extreme example; cf. note, (1949), 65 L.Q . Rev. 8.'s Wilkinson v. Adorn (1813), 1 V. and B. 422, at p. 466. 35 E.R .
163, at p. 180; quoted with approval by Lord Chelmsford in Hill v. Crook,
supra, footnote 7, at p. 277.
"'Jarman, op. cit., footnote 9, at p. 1755 .is The only cases concerning illegitimate children (as opposed to
adopted children and stepchildren) which I have been able to find are
Lobb v. Lobb (1910), 21 O.L.R . 262, aff'd 22 O.L.R . 15 ; Re Seibel,
[19251 4 D.L.R . 923 ; Re Millar, [1937] 3 D.L.R . 234, affd [1938] 1
D.L.R. 65 ; Re Brand (1957), 7 D.L.R . (2d) 579. In addition, of course,
there is Re Herlichka itself and the British Columbia cases cited, infra,
footnotes 19 and 24 .
19 [19501 3 D.L.R. 843.z° The fact that the child was born after the date of the will, and
therefore could not have been personally in the contemplation of the




British Columbia held that the illegitimate child was entitled to the
residuary estate . He. held that the rule which restricted the prima
facie meaning of the ward "child" so as to exclude illegitimate
children was a judge-made rule of public policy which no longer
prevailed in British,Columbia . It no longer prevailed because the
public policy of the province, as evidenced by its statutes, was
uniformly in the direction of removing the disabilities which at-
tached to illegitimacy . This was so even in 1928 when this will
had been made, for at that time the province had enacted statutes
providing for the maintenance of illegitimate children, legitimating
illegitimate children whose parents subsequently inter-married
and permitting illegitimate children to inherit from their mother
on intestacy. In these circumstances it was reasonable to presume
that a testatrix in British Columbia would use the word "child" in
its "ordinary meaning" as including an illegitimate child.
After 1950 several provinces, including British Columbia,
amended their Wills Acts to give statutory force to the Hogbin
rule." British Columbia's amendment, which was made in 1960,
consisted of a new section in these terms : 22
31 . In the construction of a will, except when a contrary intention
appears by the will, an illegitimate child shall be treated as if he were
the legitimate child of his mother:
This provision applied only to wills made after 1960." For wills
made before 1960 the question whether Hogbin was rightly de-
cided was still 'open.
Since 1960 the courts of British Columbia have had to decide
three cases concerning wills made before 1960 in which the
question has been whether, an illegitimate 'child was included in
the description "child", "children" or "issue" .` In two of the
cases the illegitimate child was born after the date of the will. ; and
in none of the cases were there indications on the face of the
will or in the surrounding circumstances which clearly indicated
the illegitimate child." In each of the three cases the decision
time the courts would not allow gifts to future illegitimate children at all,
on grounds of public policy ; see Hill v . Crook, supra, footnote 7, at p.
278, per Lord Chelmsford. This strict view has been relaxed, but the old
law fingers on as a reinforcement of the prima facie meaning : see Jarman,
op . cit ., footnote 9, pp. 1773-1783 ; Re Millar, [19371 3 D.L.R. 234, affd
[19381 1 D.L.R. 65.
"Alberta, S.A., 1960, c. 118, s . 34; British Columbia, S.B.C., 1960,
c. 62, s . 31 ; Manitoba, S.M ., 1964 (1st Sess.), c. 57, s . 34 ; New Brunswick,
S.N.B ., 1959, c . 15, s . 33 ; Saskatchewan, S.S., 1971, c. 67, s . 3 . The U.K.
has enacted a similar rule : Family Law Reform Act 1969, part R.
22 S.B.C., 1960, c . 62, s. 31 ; now R.S.B.C., 1960 . c. 408, s. 31 .
23 ]bid ., s . 47 .
24 Re Hervey (1960), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 615; Re Stevenson (1966), 66
D.L.R . (2d) 717 ; Re Dunsmuir (1968), 67 D.L.R . (2d) 227 ; see also
Re Simpson Estate (1969), 70 W.W.R . 626, 630, where these cases are
approved .
25 In Re Hervey, supra, footnote 24, where the illegitimate child was
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was in favour of the illegitimate child, and the reasoning in Re
Hogbin was expressly approved .
The result is that there are now four Canadian cases which
decide that "children" prima facie includes illegitimate children
as well as legitimate children . Admittedly the decisions are all
at first instance. Admittedly they all come out of one province .
And admittedly there are a few Canadian cases applying the old
rule ." But the new rule has the overwhelming advantage that it
will produce better and fairer results in the interpretation of
wills. Attitudes to illegitimacy have changed. We no longer at-
tempt to visit the sins of the fathers on the children . We no
longer believe that recognition of the claims of illegitimate chil-
dren will encourage immorality ." We are even becoming unsure
of what we mean by "sin" and "immorality" . And these changes
are abundantly reflected in the statutes of every jurisdiction which
provide for the support of illegitimate children, which legitimate
many children who would have been illegitimate fifty years ago,
and which place illegitimate children for many purposes on an
equal footing with legitimate children .
Dr . J. H. C. Morris, in the article referred to earlier, con-
cedes these points, out argues that the courts are powerless to
change their rules of construction ; to do so would be to usurp
"the function of the legislature", and (apparently just as bad)
would "require the rewriting of the whole of the chapters on
gifts to children in the textbooks on wills" ." But surely all but
the most ardent advocates of the declaratory theory of the judi-
cial function would allow the courts the power to acknowledge
that the prima facie meaning of an ordinary word may change
with the times. We are, after all, dealing only with a rule of
construction . The new prima facie meaning would still give way
to indications in the will itself or the circumstances surrounding
its execution that the testator did indeed intend to exclude ille-
gitimate children . The hard fact is that the decisions denying
recovery to illegitimate children, and the textbook accounts of the
law, have utterly failed to convince testators that when they
use the term "children" they must use it in the sense of legitimate
born before the date of the will, the only armchair evidence was that
the testator recognized the illegitimate child of his sister as his nephew,
and was on affectionate terms with him . Whittaker J . (at p. 617) seemed
to think that this would have been sufficient to satisfy the old rule in
Hill v. Crook, but this is dubious . In Re Stevenson, supra, footnote 24,
and Re Dunsmuir, supra, footnote 24, the illegitimate child was born
after the date of the will, and the rule in Hill v . Crook, no matter how
generously interpreted, could not possibly have sustained the decision :
see supra, footnote 20 .
"Cases cited, supra, footnote 18 .
27 Cf. Sydall v . Castings Ltd. . [19661 3 All E.R . 770, at pp . 772-773,
per Lord Denning, M.R .




children . ]instead they persist in using the term in its more
usual sense." The time has come for Canadian courts "to hoist
the white flag- ."
TRUSTS-DISTINCTION BETWEEN POWERS OF APPOINTMENT AND
TRUST POWERS-CERTAINTY OF OBJECT-THE SAGA OF RE
BADEN'S DEED TRUST.-In larch of this year another chapter
was written in the lengthy saga of Re Baden's Deed Trust! This
case has travelled from the Chancery Division to the House of
Lords, back once again to the Chancery Division and from there.
again to the Court of Appeal . Can it now be said that an unim-
peachable decision has been reached and that litigation is at an
end or will a further appeal be launched to further exhaust the
already much depleted trust fund?
Before relating the chain of events as they occurred in this
chapter of trust litigation I[ propose to summarize very briefly
the law as it stood in 1967 when Re Baden's Deed Trust made
its first appearance in the Chancery Division .
At this time the courts drew a firm distinction between mere
powers of appointment and trust powers . The former conferred
on the donee of the power a discretion, the latter conferred upon
him a duty. One of the most important features, of this distinc-
tion was the divergent tests for determining certainty of object .
All the objects of a trust power had to be ascertained or ascertain-
able so the trustees could, in effect, draw up a list of all the pos-
sible objects. This test was laid down by the Court of Appeal in
P. W. HOGG*
29 As is pointed out in a"note, (1947), 63 L.Q . Rev . 149, the testator
who writes his own will is unaware of the rules of construction ; the testator
who has his will professionally drawn is also unaware of the rules of
construction and for that reason may not disclose to his solicitor that
some or all of his intended beneficiaries are illegitimate .
IORe Jennings, [1930] Ir. R . 196, at p . 200, per Meredith 1 . speaking
of the judicial interpretation of the word "money" ; quoted in Re Hogbin,
supra, footnote 19, at p. 848 .
Since writing this comment, I have been informed by counsel for the
Official Guardian, who represented the illegitimate children in the proceed-
ings, that no appeal was taken from Osler J .'s decision because a settlement
was arranged in which the estate was shared by both families .
* P . W. Hogg, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
'Re Baden's Deed Trusts, Baden v. Smith, [1967] 3 All E.R . 159,
[1967] 1 W.L.R . 1457 (Ch. D.), [1969] 1 All E.R. 1016, (1969] 2 Ch.
388, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 12 (C.A .) ; sub nom . McPhail v . Doulton, [1970] 2
All E.R . 228, [1971] A.C. 424, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1110 (H.L.) ; Re Baden's
Deed Trusts (No . 2), Baden v. Smith, [1971] 3 All E.R . 985 (Ch. D.) ;
The Times, March 27th, 1972 (C.A.) :
